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This article analyzes cases of interest to employers decided by the 
Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois Appellate Courts from June 2014-
June 2015 in both private and public sectors.  
Within the last year, the Illinois Supreme Court was required to 
analyze a case, which came from the Fifth District, Michael v. Precision 
Alliance Group, LLC,1 which involved a causation issue in an agricultural-
based retaliatory discharge claim.  The appellate court cases addressed 
various other issues including age discrimination, arbitration, union issues 
and school district cases, unemployment benefits, and negligent hiring and 
retention.  Illinois Acts were also examined, such as the Illinois Personnel 
Record Review Act, the Whistleblower Act, and the Drug Free Work Place 
Act. 
The cases discussed within this article are organized by subject, as 
displayed in the outline above. 
II. AGE DISCRIMINATION  
A.  Cipolla v. The Village of Oak Lawn2 
 
In Cipolla,3 the Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the circuit 
court’s ruling in favor of the employer.  At age 60, Diane Cipolla 
(“Cipolla”) was a 12-year employee of the Village of Oak Lawn 
(“Village”).4  Cipolla was the business regulation officer for the Village’s 
finance department.5  In 2008, the Village manager informed Cipolla that 
her job was being eliminated due to budget constraints.6 Cipolla 
subsequently filed a claim against the Village alleging age discrimination in 
violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act.7  
Cipolla argued that on the day before she was terminated, the Village 
board met in a closed executive session and her supervisor commented that 
Cipolla was “older,” and that her position would be eliminated and her job 
responsibilities transferred to another Village employee who was 20 years 
younger.8 Cipolla contended that budget constraints were only a pretext for 
her termination, because not long after her termination, the Village hired a 
                                                     
1, 2014 IL 117376.  
2. 2015 IL App (1st) 132228, ¶ 1.  
3.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
6.  Id. 
7.  775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A) (West 2012).  
8.  Cipolla, 2015 IL App (1st) 132228, ¶ 6. 
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budget director for a higher salary than she received as the business 
regulation officer.9  The Village denied Cipolla’s allegations and argued 
that no other similarly situated younger employees were treated differently.  
Furthermore, the Village never sought a replacement for her position.10 The 
Village explained that Cipolla was terminated for budgetary reasons, given 
that it had a deficit of more than $1 million and as a result, cut personnel 
costs.11  
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Village and denied 
Cipolla’s motion for a new trial.12  Cipolla appealed, arguing that the circuit 
court abused its discretion by refusing to clarify for the jury the meaning of 
the word “fired” and that the jury should have been given a “cat’s paw” 
liability instruction, which places liability on an employer when a 
supervisory employee acts with discriminatory intent to cause a higher-up 
employee to take adverse action against the plaintiff.13  The First District 
affirmed, holding the jury’s question whether “fired” included laid off, 
terminated, or elimination of Cipolla’s position was a question of fact for 
the jury to decide, and the court did not abuse its discretion.14  The court 
also held that the evidence at trial did not warrant a cat’s paw liability 
instruction and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in that 
regard.15  The court noted that to succeed under the cat’s paw theory, a 
plaintiff must show the non-decision maker exercised such “singular 
influence” over the decision maker that the decision to terminate was the 
product of “blind reliance.”16  The court held that the Village manager had 
the authority to make all personnel decisions.17  Department directors could 
make recommendations regarding hiring and firing of employees, but there 
was no testimony indicating that the Village manager blindly relied on the 
finance department director when he decided to terminate Cipolla.18  In 
addition, for Cipolla’s termination to become final, the budget amendments 
that proposed the elimination of the business licensing officer position had 
been approved by the majority of the Village board.19  Thus, the Appellate 
Court concluded that Cipolla was not prejudiced by the circuit court’s 
decision not to give the cat’s paw liability instruction.20 
  
                                                     
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
11. Id. 
12.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
13.  Id. at ¶¶ 28, 42, 44. 
14.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
15.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at ¶ 46. 
20.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
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III. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 
Retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the general rule that a 
non-contractual or at-will employee may be discharged by his or her 
employer at any time and for any reason.21  Under the doctrine, an employer 
may not discharge an employee if a clear mandate of public policy is 
involved.22  In Illinois, retaliatory discharge actions have been allowed in 
two settings: (1) where an employee is discharged for filing, or in 
anticipation of filing, a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act23 or; 
(2) where an employee is discharged in retaliation for the reporting of 
illegal or improper conduct, otherwise known as “whistleblowing.”24  The 
rationale is that in these situations, an employer could effectively frustrate a 
significant public policy by using its power of dismissal in a coercive 
manner.  Therefore, recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge is considered necessary to vindicate the public policy underlying 
the employee’s activity, and to deter employer conduct inconsistent with 
that policy.25  
To sustain a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, an employee 
must prove: (1) the employer discharged the employee, (2) the discharge 
was in retaliation of the employee’s activities, and (3) the discharge violates 
a clear mandate of public policy.26 
A.  Michael v. Precision Alliance Group27 
In Michael,28 the plaintiff Wayne Michael (“Michael”) filed a 
retaliatory discharge claim against the defendant, Precision Alliance Group, 
LLC (“Precision”), an agricultural supply business dealing in soybean 
seeds.  Michael alleged that he and two of his co-workers were discharged 
in retaliation for reporting Precision to the State of Illinois for shipping 
underweight product.29  In the year prior to the lawsuit, Precision began 
experiencing a problem with underweight seed bags, which was a violation 
under an Illinois law that required every bag to be labeled as containing a 
certain weight of seeds actually weigh that amount.30  
                                                     
21.  Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 182 (1978). 
22.  Id. at 183. 
23.  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 et seq. (1992). 
24.  Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 185 Ill. 2d 372, 376 (1998). 
25.  Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 505 (1991). 
26.  Turner v. Mem’l Medical Ctr. 233 Ill. 2d 494, 500 (2009). 
27.  2014 IL 117376.  
28.  Id. at ¶¶ 1–3. 
29.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
30.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
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After co-worker Shawn Dudley (“Dudley”) was terminated for 
horseplay, Precision’s seed bag weight problems were reported to the 
Illinois Department of Agriculture. When Dudley’s unemployment 
compensation was denied, Michael and several of his co-workers assisted 
Dudley by providing him the lot numbers and locations of underweight 
bags.31  Approximately a month later, Precision’s corporate office decided 
to eliminate 22 positions as a result of slow business.32  Michael and three 
others, including one of the assisting co-workers, were chosen for 
termination.33  The evidence showed that Michael was dismissed because 
he spent too much time standing around, needed a more diverse skill set, 
and did not want to perform certain tasks.34  Furthermore, when he finished 
his tasks, he would not look for other tasks.35  The management staff 
claimed they were unaware that Michael or his co-worker had any role in 
reporting the company to the Department at the time they were discharged 
and only learned of their involvement during discovery of the case.36  The 
circuit court entered judgment in favor of Precision, finding that it offered a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Michael and his 
coworker, and that they had failed to prove the reason for their discharge 
was pretextual.37  
The Appellate Court, Fifth District, reversed the decision, reasoning 
that the circuit court erroneously increased the plaintiff’s burden by 
requiring them to prove both causation and to disprove defendant’s defense 
of pretext.38  The case was remanded for further proceedings on the issue of 
plaintiffs’ damages.39  On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Precision 
argued that the appellate court improperly relieved plaintiffs of the burden 
to establish the case.40  The Illinois Supreme Court agreed.41  Although the 
circuit court applied the wrong standard in this case, the Court nevertheless 
agreed with the circuit court’s conclusion that Precision presented valid and 
legitimate reasons for plaintiffs’ discharges, and that the plaintiffs failed to 
meet their burden of proving that they were discharged in retaliation for 
their protected activity.42  The Court explained that the Fifth District 
improperly held that plaintiffs proved causation based on the circuit court’s 
finding of a “causal nexus” between plaintiffs’ discharges and their 
                                                     
31.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
32.  Id. at ¶ 17.  
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
35. Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at ¶¶ 19–22. 
38.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
39.  Id.; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). 
40.  Michael, 2014 IL 117376 ¶ 33. 
41.  Id.  
42.  Id. at ¶¶ 35, 36. 
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protected activity.43  Thus, the Court further held that plaintiffs failed to 
prove the element of causation, and therefore, found that the circuit court 
further properly entered judgment in favor of Precision.44  The Court 
concluded that the Appellate Court erred in reversing that judgment.45 
B.  Flick v. Southern Illinois Healthcare, NFP46 
Causation between a plaintiff’s discharge and a protected activity was 
also addressed by the Fifth District case Flick.47  There, Cindy Flick 
(“Flick”) worked for the defendant, Southern Illinois Healthcare, NFP, 
(“SIH”) as the director of its medical laboratories.48  During her 
employment, Flick discovered quality control failures in the chemistry 
department at one of the defendant’s hospitals, which constituted a 
violation of the federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 
1988 (“CLIA”).49  She reported her concerns to the medical director and the 
manager of the lab.50  Months later, the hospital administrator told Flick 
that her management style was not conducive to a long-term relationship 
with the hospital and presented her with a severance agreement.51  Days 
later, Flick called the compliance help line to report her concern regarding 
possible CLIA violations in the laboratory and then rejected the severance 
agreement.  Flick’s employment was not terminated but her responsibilities 
were limited and her salary was frozen.  She continued her employment for 
approximately two more years. During that time, she was responsible for 
ensuring the company’s smooth transition in converting to a new computer 
system.52  The transition was problematic.  The hospital administrator again 
approached Flick with a severance package, and despite her refusal to 
accept, Flick’s employment was terminated.53  
Flick filed a petition alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for 
reporting possible violations of CLIA.54  She alleged that prior to the 
“attempt to terminate” her employment, her performance reviews were 
favorable and she received annual pay increases.55  She testified that she 
believed that the only reason she was not fired after she declined the first 
                                                     
43.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
44.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
45.  Id.   
46. 2014 IL App (5th) 130319.  
47.  Id. at ¶ 1.  
48.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
49.  Id. at ¶ 4; 42 U.S.C. § 263a et seq. (2000). 
50.  Flick, 2014 IL App (5th) 130319, ¶ 4. 
51.  Id. at ¶¶ 4–5. 
52.  Id. at ¶¶ 7–8. 
53.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
54.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
55.  Id. 
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severance agreement was because she had reported to the CLIA hotline.56 
In response, SIH filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Flick 
presented no evidence of a causal connection between her actions in raising 
concerns about the lab’s compliance with CLIA and her termination.57  The 
court granted the motion, finding that Flick exercised a statutory right when 
she called the CLIA compliance hotline, but that she could not establish 
that her discharge was in retaliation for exercising this right just because of 
timing.58 
On appeal, Flick argued that the court erred in finding that she did not 
engage in “protected activity” until she called the compliance help line to 
report the possible CLIA violations two days after she was presented with 
her first severance agreement.59  According to Flick, the fact that she voiced 
her concerns about the lab’s procedures prior to the meeting was also a 
protected activity.60  The Appellate Court, Fifth District, agreed that voicing 
her concerns was protected activity, but Flick failed to prove any evidence 
of a causal connection.61  Flick also argued that the court erred in finding 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding causation 
because the two-year gap in time between her activity and termination does 
not automatically defeat a claim that the termination was retaliatory.62  
The court held that Flick’s second argument also failed, and reiterated 
the plaintiff’s requirement to present evidence of a causal connection.63  
The court noted that Flick presented no evidence to support her theory that 
the hospital administrator was prevented from discharging her initially and 
needed to wage a two-year campaign of retaliatory actions to discharge her 
later.64  Flick acknowledged that her employment with SIH was at-will and 
there was no evidence that SIH was required to document ongoing 
dissatisfaction in order to terminate her employment.65  Therefore, the court 
concluded that it was the plaintiff’s burden to provide evidence of the 
causal link between a retaliatory motive and her discharge, and therefore 
the circuit court properly granted summary judgment.66 
  
                                                     
56.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
57.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
58.  Id. at ¶¶ 17–18. 
59.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
60.  Id. 
61. Id.  
62.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
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C.  Taylor v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago67 
In another appellate court decision, this time for the Appellate Court, 
First District, the court distinguished whether a retaliatory discharge claim 
applied to an at-will employee compared to a contractual employee in 
Taylor.68 In that case, plaintiff Kenneth Taylor (“Taylor”) began his 
employment with the defendant, the Board of Education of the City of 
Chicago (“Board”), as a teacher at Robeson High School.69  Shortly 
thereafter, he attained tenure.70  After continuing his education and 
obtaining a master degree, the Board promoted him to serve as the assistant 
principal at Goodlow Magnet School (“Goodlow”), an elementary school 
for students from pre-kindergarten through eighth grade.71  The assistant 
principal position was contractual with a four-year duration, after which his 
contract could be terminated “for cause.”72  Upon accepting this position, 
Taylor relinquished his tenured status.73  
During his employment, Taylor was informed that a special education 
teacher kicked a student and caused the student to fall backwards and strike 
his head on the floor.74  Taylor was designated a “mandated reporter” of 
child abuse under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act,75 which 
requires all school personnel to immediately report any reasonable 
suspicion of child abuse to the Illinois Department of Children and Family 
Services (“DCFS”).  Accordingly, Taylor reported the incident to the 
appropriate authorities.76  
Taylor testified that his supervisor, the principal of Goodlow, severely 
reprimanded him for reporting the incident to the DCFS and the police.77 
The supervisor told Taylor that he mishandled the situation because the 
special education teacher was a trained therapist who was engaging in an 
effective form of “role playing” therapy with the child.78  Taylor claimed 
that after the incident, his supervisor became hostile and uncommunicative 
toward him, and that the Board also began a campaign of harassing 
behavior against him.79  Thereafter, Taylor began to receive lower 
performance ratings and was demoted to the position of social studies 
                                                     
67. 2014 IL App (1st) 123744. 
68.  Id. at ¶ 1.  
69.  Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5.  
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. at ¶8. 
75.  Id. at ¶ 17; 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (West 2007). 
76.  Taylor, 2014 IL App (1st) 123744. ¶ 10. 
77.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
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teacher.  He was later reassigned to supervising students who were placed 
on in-school suspension.80  After experiencing back pain from intervening 
between several student fights, Taylor took two leaves of absence but upon 
his return, was informed that he overextended his leave.81  He was 
reinstated by the Board but was notified that he would be released from the 
contract a month later.82  
Taylor filed suit against the Board, seeking damages for retaliatory 
discharge and violation of the Illinois Whistleblower Act,83 claiming that he 
was discharged from his employment and subjected to an ongoing 
campaign of retaliatory acts by the Board because he reported an act of 
alleged abuse.84  A jury awarded Taylor over $1,000,000 in damages, which 
included compensatory and emotional distress damages that arose from the 
discharge and the Board’s retaliatory conduct.85  
On appeal, the Board argued that Taylor could not maintain an action 
for retaliatory discharge because he was not an at-will employee.  The First 
District agreed, noting that Taylor admitted in his testimony that he 
understood that he had a four-year term and that his supervisor could 
choose not to renew his employment at the end of that term.86  Because 
Taylor was subject to a definite contractual term of employment and that 
the Board exercised its option not to renew that term, the court concluded 
that Taylor was not an at-will employee.87  Thus, the court reversed the 
judgment in favor of Taylor on his retaliatory discharge claim.88 
D.  Dale v. South Central Illinois Mass Transit District89 
In a workers’ compensation related retaliatory discharge claim, the 
Fifth District analyzed the case Dale.90  The plaintiff, Richard Dale 
(“Dale”), was employed as a bus driver for the defendant, South Central 
Illinois Mass Transit District (“South Central”).91  Dale filed a complaint 
against South Central alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising 
his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.92  Dale had filed a 
workers’ compensation claim after he injured his left shoulder in a work-
                                                     
80.  Id. at ¶¶ 14–15, 16, 22. 
81.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
82.  Id. at ¶29. 
83.  Id. at ¶ 1; 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1 et seq. (2009). 
84.  Taylor, 2014 IL App (1st) 123744, ¶ 1. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. at ¶¶ 34, 39. 
87.  Id. at ¶ 43. 
88.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
89. 2014 IL App (5th) 130361. 
90.  Id. at ¶ 1.  
91.  Id.  
92.  Id.; see also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 et seq. (2010). 
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related accident and was unable to work.93  Although his physician 
recommended surgery, he refused and alleged that South Central 
improperly disputed his claim.94  He took a 12-week approved leave of 
absence under the Family Medical Leave Act,95 but his employment was 
terminated after the 12 weeks expired, because he was medically unable to 
return to work.96  Dale filed a complaint against South Central and alleged 
that South Central engaged in the illegal practice of retaliatory discharge 
when it terminated his employment as a bus driver as a result of his 
exercising his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act.97  The circuit 
court entered an order that granted South Central’s request for partial 
summary judgment for lost wages because his lost wages were caused by 
his inability to work rather than the alleged wrongful discharge.98  
The circuit court also granted Dale’s request for certified questions, 
under Supreme Court Rule 308(a), and were accepted for interlocutory 
appeal.99 Both questions involved whether the Act’s provisions barred an 
injured employee from recovering damages for lost wages in a retaliatory 
discharge lawsuit when the employee is injured in a work-related accident 
and is unable to work as a result.100  
The court held that the employee’s damages for lost wages fell within 
the exclusivity provisions of the Act.101  The court explained that the Act’s 
purpose is to provide a system of imposing liability on employers without 
fault for accidental work-related injuries and, in return, prohibiting common 
law suits by employees against the employer.102  However, an action for 
retaliatory discharge is not completely barred by the exclusivity provisions 
of the Act.103  “[A]ny diminution in a plaintiff’s earnings directly related to 
that plaintiff’s injury, but not connected to the employer’s tortious 
discharge, is not properly included in the retaliatory discharge award.”104 
The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the employee’s lost wages 
were causally connected to the workplace accident, not his discharge, and 
the Act provides the exclusive remedy for the employee to recover the lost 
                                                     
93.  Dale, 2014 IL App (5th) 130361, ¶¶ 4–6. 
94.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
95.  Id. at ¶ 5; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006). 
96.  Dale, 2014 IL App (5th) 130361, ¶ 5. 
97.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
98.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
99.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
100.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. at ¶ 28. 
103.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
104.  Id. (citing Kritzen v. Flender Corp., 226 Ill. App. 3d 541, 559, 589 N.E.2d 909, 922 (2d Dist. 
1992)). 
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wages.105  Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to the circuit court 
for further proceedings regarding lost wages.106  
IV. ARBITRATION 
A.  Fuqua v. SVOX AG107 
To be enforceable, an arbitration agreement, like any contract, must be 
valid and conscionable.108  In Fuqua, Kurt Fuqua (“Fuqua”) was employed 
by the defendant, SVOX USA (“SVOX”), a technology services company 
that researched and developed text-to-speech technology.109  Fuqua was 
employed as the vice president of professional services due to his reputation 
for creating numerous inventions in the field of computational linguistics.110  
When Fuqua was offered an employment position with SVOX, he was 
asked to sign an employment agreement, which contained an arbitration 
clause, stating in part “[a]ny dispute or controversy arising under or in 
connection with this Agreement or any other dispute concerning [Fuqua’s] 
employment with [SVOX USA] shall be settled exclusively by arbitration, 
conducted before a single, mutually agreed upon arbitrator.”111 
 Fuqua and SVOX negotiated, and the Agreement was eventually 
executed.112  After only 8 months of employment at SVOX, Fuqua was 
given a 90-day notice that his employment was being terminated.113  Fuqua 
subsequently filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”), alleging breach of contract and unauthorized 
withholding of wages.114  
After many court filings by both parties in both state and federal court, 
the circuit court granted SVOX’s motion to stay litigation and compel 
arbitration; Fuqua appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred, because the 
arbitration clause in the agreement was unconscionable and 
unenforceable.115 Fuqua first argued that the arbitration clause was 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, because it would be 
extremely expensive for him to pursue arbitration by requiring him to 
advance at least $23,619.25 to arbitrate.116  Fuqua further claimed that after 
                                                     
105.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
106.  Id. at ¶ 37.  
107. 2014 IL App (1st) 131429. 
108.  Id. at ¶¶ 35–36. 
109.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
110.  Id.  
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at ¶ 30. 
116.  Id. 
2015]  Survey of Illinois Law: Employment Law 623 
 
 
he was terminated, he was not employable in his field due to the non-
compete clause in the employment agreement, and thus, he was unable to 
afford the costs of arbitration.117  Additionally, Fuqua stated that the 
application of the AAA’s commercial rules to the arbitration rendered the 
arbitration clause unconscionable.118  Fuqua claimed that he originally filed 
a request for arbitration under the employment rules, which would allocate 
fees and costs differently than the commercial rules, which the arbitrator 
had decided applied in his arbitration.119  Fuqua contended that commercial 
rules were designed for arbitration disputes between businesses and not for 
claims arising out of employment agreements.120  
In response, SVOX argued that the arbitration clause in the agreement 
was valid and enforceable under the Uniform Arbitration Act and the 
Federal Arbitration Act.121  SVOX contended that the arbitration clause 
language was clear and that all of Fuqua’s claims in this case relate to this 
employment and circumstances of his termination, which fall directly under 
the arbitration clause.122  In addition, the arbitration clause met all the 
requirements of a valid and enforceable contract under Illinois law because 
it was negotiated between the parties and there was an offer and acceptance 
as evidence by the signed agreement.123  Furthermore, there was no 
evidence of any unequal bargaining power between the parties.124  
Lastly, SVOX defendants asserted that the arbitrator’s application of 
the commercial rules did not render the arbitration clause unconscionable 
because he made that determination after carefully considering the entire 
employment agreement and the AAA Rules.125  Likewise, the arbitration 
was not substantively unconscionable because the terms of the arbitration 
clause were not unfair because the arbitrator gave Fuqua multiple 
opportunities to present evidence of financial hardship, which he failed to 
prove.126 
The appellate court held that SVOX defendants had the more 
reasonable argument and interpretation of the applicable legal principals 
and concluded that the arbitration clause was not procedurally or 
substantially unconscionable.127  The court found that the agreement was 
clear and easy to understand.128  Although the arbitration provision failed to 
                                                     
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
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instruct whether the employment rules or commercial rules were applicable, 
it stated that the AAA rules would determine which rules would apply.129 
Furthermore, Fuqua negotiated with SVOX regarding the terms of the 
arbitration clause and was an active participant in the negotiations and the 
terms of the contract.130  The court found no fault in the arbitrator’s ruling, 
noting that he gave Fuqua an opportunity to present evidence to support his 
argument of undue financial hardship.131  Therefore, the circuit court’s 
judgment was affirmed and the matter was remanded with direction to 
compel arbitration.132 
B.  City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police Chapter No. 
240133 
Illinois law also provides that an arbitration award must not threaten 
public policy.134  In City of Des Plaines,135 the plaintiff, the City of Des 
Plaines (“City”), sought to terminate police officer John Bueno (“Bueno”) 
after concluding that Bueno used unnecessary and excessive force against 
arrestees, which was in violation of the General Orders of the Des Plaines 
Police Department (“Department”).  The defendant, the Union, the 
Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Chapter No. 240 (“Union”), represented 
Bueno.136  
The parties submitted the grievance to arbitration and after a three-day 
hearing, the arbitrator concluded that Bueno violated the General Orders 
and ordered Bueno to be reinstated without back pay or benefits.137  The 
arbitrator determined that termination was not appropriate, because the City 
delayed the investigation of the alleged incident and the Department 
condoned his conduct. Instead of reinstating Bueno, the City filed a motion 
to vacate the arbitration award and argued that the award violated public 
policy. The circuit court agreed and also denied the Union’s motion to 
remand to the arbitrator to determine Bueno’s likelihood of engaging in the 
same misconduct following reinstatement.138  
On appeal, the Union argued that the award did not violate public 
policy, because there was no well-defined public policy that mandated 
                                                     
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
132.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
133.  2015 IL App (1st) 140957. 
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termination of a police officer that was engaged in unnecessary use of 
force, failure to report, or untruthfulness.139 The Union maintained that 
public policy supports the award, because the Department condoned the 
conduct, the City delayed its investigation of the incidents, and the City 
destroyed relevant video evidence that resulted in prejudice to Bueno’s 
defense.140  
The First District observed that public policy analysis involves two 
steps: (1) whether a well-defined and dominant public policy can be 
identified, and, if so, then (2) whether the arbitrator’s award as reflected in 
his interpretation of the agreement violated public policy.141  Here, the 
parties offered conflicting descriptions of the public policies at stake.142  
The court held that the Union’s position improperly conflates the two-prong 
test into a single inquiry—the issue is not whether the public policy requires 
that an employee be terminated, but rather requires the identification of a 
public policy.143  The court determined that the arbitration award implicated 
a well-defined and dominant public policy, namely, the public policy 
against police officers unnecessarily using force against prisoners and being 
dishonest about that use of force during a subsequent investigation.144  In 
analyzing the second prong, the First District held that the arbitrator did not 
consider whether Bueno was likely to engage in similar misconduct 
following reinstatement.145  Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the 
case to the arbitrator to clarify the award because it could not fully assess 
the public policy implications.146 
V. LABOR 
A.  Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Board147 
In Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois,148 the issue was 
whether a high school teacher, who also acted as the collective-bargaining 
representative for university employees, could be certified as an exclusive 
collective-bargaining representative for both entities.  The Uni Faculty 
Organization, the Illinois Education Association, and the National 
                                                     
139.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
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Education Association (collectively the “Union”) filed a majority-interest 
petition to represent “all full-time and regularly employed part-time 
teaching associates at “UniHigh,” the public laboratory high school and 
educational unit of the University of Illinois (“University”).149  UniHigh 
accepted students who were considered exceptionally intelligent.150  The 
University objected to the Union’s petition and argued that the proposed 
bargaining unit was inappropriately narrow because the UniHigh teaching 
associates were a small subset of the University’s non-tenured faculty 
members and the petition did not seek to include all non-tenured faculty 
members.151 
A hearing was held before the Illinois Education Labor Relations 
Board’s (“Board”) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on the Union’s 
petition.152  The ALJ issued her recommended decision and order by 
finding the proposed unit was appropriate and recommended the Board 
certify the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for UniHigh.153 
The Union then filed a second petition to represent all full-time and non-
tenure track faculty with respect to educational employees at the 
University.154  During the hearing on the Union’s second petition, the Board 
certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative, 
and excluded UniHigh teachers from the bargaining unit.155  The University 
filed a petition for direct administrative review of the Board’s decision.156 
On appeal, the University argued that the Board erred in finding that 
clear and convincing evidence that was presented to demonstrate the 
proposed bargaining unit of UniHigh teachers would: (1) be appropriate 
under section 7 of the Education Labor Act, (2) be appropriate given the 
special circumstances and compelling justifications involved, and (3) not 
cause undue fragmentation or a proliferation of bargaining units.157  The 
Fourth District affirmed the Board’s judgment.158  The appellate court held 
that UniHigh teachers shared the same skills and functions and reported to 
their department’s head at UniHigh and not to anyone at the University.159 
Furthermore, UniHigh was a separate and distinct entity where UniHigh 
teachers had unique conditions of employment and performed distinctly 
different job duties from those of the University’s other non-tenure teaching 
                                                     
149.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
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faculty.160  The court noted the fact that the UniHigh interests were distinct 
from those of other University faculty members supports the compelling 
need for their own separate bargaining unit to represent their separate and 
unique interests.161  Finally, the court held that because UniHigh operated 
as its own entity separate from the University’s other operations, the 
certification of the UniHigh teachers into their own bargaining unit would 
not likely cause such labor instability as to disrupt the rest of the 
University’s other services in the event of a dispute.162  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the Board’s decision that clear and convincing evidence was 
presented to support recognition of the non-presumptive bargaining unit of 
the UniHigh teachers was not clearly erroneous.163 
B.  American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board164 
In another recent case, American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board 
(AFSCME II),165 the court was required to determine whether an employee 
was properly excluded from a collective-bargaining unit.  In that case, the 
petitioner, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, Council 31 (“Union”), represented a State of Illinois employee 
who worked as an Information Systems Analyst II.166  The Illinois Labor 
Relations Board sought to exclude the position from Union membership, 
because it was a “confidential employee” position within the meaning of 
section 3(c) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“Act”).167  The 
Board found that the Information Systems Analyst II position qualified the 
employee as a “confidential” employee under the Act, and the Union 
appealed.168  
In analyzing the issue, the Appellate Court, First District, first noted 
that the Act’s purpose in excluding confidential employees from any 
bargaining unit is to prevent employees from having their loyalties divided 
between their employer, who expects confidentiality in labor relations 
matters, and the union, which may seek the disclosure of management’s 
                                                     
160.  Id. at ¶ 48. 
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labor relations material to gain an advantage in the bargaining process.169 
The court also recognized the two tests specifically designated in the 
statutory definition to determine whether a position is a “confidential” 
employee position: (1) the labor-nexus test170 and (2) the authorized access 
test, which an employee is considered confidential if he or she has 
authorized access to information concerning matters specifically related to 
the collective-bargaining process between labor and management.171  The 
court ultimately held that the employee was not a confidential employee 
within the meaning of section 3(c) of the Act, reasoning that the employee 
did not have authorized access in the regular course of her job duties or that 
any other duties qualified her as a “confidential employee”172  Accordingly, 
the decision was reversed.173 
C.  American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31 v. The State of Illinois174 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31 v. The State of Illinois (AFSCME III),175 was a case of first 
impression that involved a dispute over the section 6.1 of Illinois Public 
Labor Relations Act.176  Section 6.1 allows the Governor the authority to 
“designate” up to 3,580 state employment positions.177  Under the authority 
of the statute, the Governor can file petitions, which identifies positions 
occupied by the individual objectors for exclusion from their collective 
bargaining units.178 Pursuant to section 6.1(b)(2), the Governor is permitted 
to designate the positions, and the Illinois Relations Board (“Board”) may 
approve the designation based solely on the position’s title.179  After the Act 
was passed, the petitioner, the Department of Central Management Services 
(“CMS”), on behalf of the Governor, filed petitions with the Board seeking 
to exclude certain public employment positions from collective bargaining 
units.180 AFSCME, on behalf of individuals, contested their removal from 
                                                     
169.  Id. at ¶ 32 (citing Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cnty. v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & 
Mun. Emps., Council 31 (Chief Judge II), 153 Ill. 2d 508, 523, 607 N.E.2d 182, 189 (1992)). 
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their respective collective bargaining units and filed objections to the 
petitions. The Board approved the Governor’s decision to deny the 
individual’s collective bargaining rights, relying on the title of the 
positions—namely, “senior public service administrator,” to determine the 
Governor’s action was appropriate.181  
On appeal, AFSCME argued that section 6.1 was unconstitutional, 
because it deprived the designated employees of their procedural due 
process rights and therefore denied them the opportunity to object to the 
designations.182  However, the court held AFSCME failed to demonstrate 
that procedural due process concerns rendered that statute unconstitutional, 
reasoning that the time requirements of 10 days to file an objection could be 
met and without any other evidence that the time requirement prevented an 
employee from meaningfully challenging the Governor’s action.183 
AFSCME’s argument that the delegation was improper, because the 
Governor was given legislative authority to determine classifications of 
employees under the Act without sufficient guiding principles, also 
failed.184  The court explained that the Governor was not given a “blank 
check” because he was limited to expressly stated positions, which was 
subject to review by the Board.185  Finally, the court rejected the equal 
protection argument, explaining that there is no dispute that the State’s 
interest in governmental efficiency is legitimate and that the statute’s means 
of achieving that interest are rational and reasonable.186  The statute did not 
aim to strip particular people of their collective bargaining rights, but 
instead focused on those persons’ employment positions.187  While section 
6.1 permits certain employees to be treated differently, it was not in an 
unconstitutional manner, because there is no constitutional right to public 
sector collective bargaining.188  Therefore, the Board’s decision was 
affirmed.189 
D.  Department of Central Management Services v. Illinois Labor Relations 
Board190 
The Governor’s designation power under section 6.1 of the Illinois 
Public Labor Relations Act (“Act”)191 was also challenged in the Fourth 
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District.192  In addition, section 11(e) of the Act was analyzed in 
Department of Central Management Services.193  In that case, the 
petitioners, the Department of Central Management Services (“CMS”) 
along with the Illinois Commerce Commission, Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Commission, and Pollution Control Board, sought review of 
a decision by the Illinois Labor Relations Board (“Board”), which found 
that the positions designated by the Governor for exclusion of collective 
bargaining did not qualify for designation under section 6.1(a).194  CMS 
filed gubernatorial designation of exclusion petition pursuant to section 6.1 
of the Act to exclude nine director positions in the Illinois Commerce 
Commission, two public service administrator option 8L positions in the 
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, and two scientist positions in 
the Pollution Control Board.195 AFSCME filed objections to the 
designations in each case, asserting that the positions did not qualify for 
designation under section 6.1 because the respective entities were not 
directly responsible to the Governor.196  The Illinois Labor Relations Board 
(“Board”) consolidated the cases and the Board accepted the Administrative 
Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) recommended decision to dismiss the petitions.197  On 
a direct administrative review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335, the 
Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding 
that under the plain language of the statute, section 6.1 of the Act is not 
applicable to the three entities at issue and they do not directly report to the 
Governor.  Therefore, the Governor cannot invoke section 6.1 to designate 
positions in those agencies for exclusion from collective bargaining and 
self-representation198 
E.  Community Unit School District No. 5 v. Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Board (McLean and Woodford Counties)199 
An unfair labor practice charge was addressed in the Fourth District 
case McLean and Woodford Counties.200  The Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Board (“Board”) found the petitioner, Community Unit School 
District No. 5 in McLean and Woodford Counties (“District”) engaged in 
unfair labor practices against the respondent, the American Federation of 
                                                                                                                           
191.  5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6.1 (2012). 
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State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME) with 
respect to student transportation services.201 Specifically, AFSCME alleged 
the District violated various sections of the Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Act202 (“Act”) by contracting school bus services in retaliation 
against the bus drivers and bus monitors for choosing AFSCME as their 
representative and failing to bargain in good faith.203  Despite the District’s 
argument that it subcontracted transportation services due to significant cost 
savings, the circuit court granted a preliminary injunction and decided that 
the Board raised a fair question of an unfair labor practice by the District.204  
The court denied the District’s motion to stay the order granting the 
injunction.205 
On appeal, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed and found 
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition for 
a preliminary injunction.206  The court noted that the Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) conducted hearings and issued her recommended decision, 
where she found the bus drivers and bus monitors to be engaged in 
protected union activity when they chose AFSCME as their exclusive 
bargaining representative.207  The ALJ found the District acted with anti-
union animus when it subcontracted the transportation services and 
discharged members of AFSCME’s bargaining unit.208  
On direct administrative review of the Board’s order, the District 
argued that the Board’s findings were erroneous.209  The Fourth District 
reversed, holding that evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion of 
anti-union animus on behalf of the District.210  The court noted that the ALJ 
relied on the District’s decision to subcontract a portion of its transportation 
services and then solicit bids for those services occurring within months of 
AFSCME being certified as an exclusive representative of the bus drivers 
and monitors.211  However, the evidence showed that the District 
administrators responded to a growing problem—transportation—by 
meeting with the union and reassigning staff and mechanics to driving duty 
and entering into emergency subcontracting for transportation services.212 
In fact, the transportation department’s problems were established in 2003 
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and had grown significantly worse over the years.213  The court reasoned 
that even if a prima facie case could be established based on the employee’s 
engagement in a protected activity, the District had a legitimate business 
reason for the adverse business action not only because of the cost savings, 
but also because the District had experienced an excessive amount of 
absences in the transportation department along with other issues that 
caused District administrators and staff to spend time responding to 
complaints regarding operational issues.214  The court concluded, “[A]n 
employer’s ability to outsource, or threaten outsourcing, is part of the 
bargaining process and an important weapon in negotiations.”215 
Furthermore, the District bargained in good faith, and therefore failed to 
rise to the level of an unfair labor practice.216   
VI. SCHOOLS 
In Illinois, a tenured teacher can only be dismissed “for cause” from 
his or her employment in an action initiated by the school district.217 
A.  Kinsella v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago218 
Misconduct by tenured teachers was addressed in two First District 
cases:  Kinsella,219 and Kimble v. Illinois State Board of Education.220  In 
Kinsella, the defendant Board of Education for the City of Chicago 
(“Board”) terminated the plaintiff-petitioner Kathleen Kinsella’s 
(“Kinsella”) employment as a tenured teacher for violation of Board’s Drug 
and Alcohol Free Workplace Policy when she was found to have been 
under the influence of alcohol at work based on her blood-alcohol level of 
0.053.221  The hearing officer found that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove that Kinsella was under the influence of alcohol during a hearing and 
recommended her reinstatement.222  However, the Board terminated 
Kinsella, finding she was under the influence of alcohol in violation of 
Board policies.  Kinsella filed an appeal to the First District for 
administrative review pursuant to 34-85(a)(8) of the Illinois School 
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Code.223  Kinsella explained during her testimony that the night before the 
incident, that she went to dinner at a restaurant and had three sangrias and 
returned to work the next morning without eating anything.224  
On appeal, Kinsella argued that the Board was required to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that she was under the influence of alcohol and 
that she cannot be presumed to be impaired solely because of her 
Breathalyzer test result.225  The court agreed, reasoning that while the odor 
of alcohol provides a basis for requiring an employee to submit to testing, 
the rules clearly state that an additional factor must exist before disciplinary 
action is warranted—namely, the employee must be under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol.226  The court noted that the Board’s manual defined under 
the influence as “any mental, emotional, sensory or physical impairment 
due to the use of drugs or alcohol.”  The court agreed with the hearing 
officer, who found that there was no evidence that Kinsella exhibited any 
mental, emotional, sensory or physical impairment caused by alcohol on the 
day in question.227  The court concluded that the Board’s finding was not 
based on any evidence of impairment, but instead was solely based on 
Kinsella’s Breathalyzer test result.228  Therefore, the Board’s decision that 
Kinsella was “under the influence” and that her conduct was cause for 
dismissal was arbitrary and the decision was reversed.229 
B.  Kimble230 
In Kimble, plaintiff Sharon Kimble (“Kimble”) was a tenured teacher 
with 20 years of service to Parkside Academy when her employment was 
terminated by the defendant, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago 
(“Board”), after allegations that she pushed and choked a 10-year old 
student.231  The incident was reported to the Department of Children and 
Family Services (“DCFS”), which determined that the allegations of abuse 
were unfounded.  However, the Board approved the dismissal charges 
against Kimble based on hearing officer’s recommendation and the Chicago 
Public Schools’ employee discipline and due process policy, which 
prohibited the use of corporal punishment.232  Kimble filed a complaint for 
administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County, claiming that the 
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Board’s decision was contrary to law and against the manifest weight of the 
evidence.233  The appeal focused on the fact that Kimble was the only 
person who witnessed the alleged event and the only person to testify at the 
hearing.234  
The circuit court reversed in part and remanded for further findings of 
fact, holding that the hearing contained inadmissible hearsay and that the 
factual basis of the hearing officer’s recommendation was not apparent 
from the record.235  The circuit court affirmed on further administrative 
review after the hearing officer issued a clarification and the Board issued a 
supplemental order.236  On appeal, Kimble argued that she was denied her 
right to due process because the admission of the child’s hearsay testimony 
violated her right to confront her accuser as well as denied her right to 
notice of the specific charges against her.237  The court agreed and 
emphasized the inappropriateness of the decision given the fact that the 
tenured teacher’s termination after 20 years of service was based almost 
entirely on hearsay statements of one student who was not present at the 
hearing.238  Furthermore, there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged incident 
and the teacher denied the conduct.  Therefore, the court concluded that the 
termination of a tenured teacher’s employment without giving her the 
opportunity to cross-examine the accuser violated due process and the 
Board’s decision was reversed.239 
VII. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act240 (“Act”) affords 
economic relief to employees who, through no fault of his or her own, 
become involuntarily unemployed.241  However, a former employee may 
not receive benefits under the Act if his or her discharge was for 
misconduct.  Misconduct has been defined as when: (i) the employer has a 
reasonable work policy or rule that (ii) the employee deliberately and 
willfully violates, and (iii) the violation either harms the employer or was 
repeated by the employee despite a warning.242  In 2014, two First District 
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decisions analyzed whether employees were discharged for misconduct, 
and came to opposing conclusions. 
A.  Baker v. Department of Employment Security243 
Unemployment benefits were properly denied in Baker.244  In that 
case, plaintiff Ronald Baker was employed as an electrician for the Chicago 
Park District (“Park District”) for 14 years before he was discharged for 
violating the Park District’s code of conduct for violence in the 
workplace.245  Baker was reported after he had an argument with his co-
workers and supervisors.  Baker allegedly said he might “go Arizona” on 
his supervisors.246  The supervisors took the reference to the Arizona 
killings247 as a threat, filed a police report, and terminated Baker’s 
employment.  As a result of his termination, Baker applied for 
unemployment insurance benefits but was denied due to the fact that he was 
discharged for misconduct.248  Baker appealed for reconsideration of his 
claim and a referee investigated.  Baker’s supervisor told the referee that he 
felt threatened after Baker’s comments.249  After questioning the human 
resources manager and his supervisor, the referee concluded that he was 
discharged due to misconduct as defined in the Unemployment Insurance 
Act250 and was subject to disqualification of benefits under that section.251  
Baker then appealed to the Board of Review (“Board”), which affirmed the 
referee’s decision and found that the further investigating of evidence was 
unnecessary.252  
The circuit court affirmed the decision and Baker appealed.253  In an 
appeal from an administrative review proceeding, the court reviewed the 
decision of the Board rather than that of the circuit court.  The First District 
first noted that an employee willfully violates a rule or policy when he is 
aware of and consciously disregards that rule.  Baker argued that his remark 
was not threatening, he did not appear angry, and he did not raise his voice 
when he made the remark.254  The court recognized that the Park District’s 
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policy forbade any comment creating a reasonable fear of injury to another 
person.255  Baker’s remark referred to a violent fatal shooting incident that 
occurred just weeks earlier and was directed individually to each of the co-
workers in Baker’s presence.  Furthermore, the referee concluded that 
Baker’s supervisor interpreted the remark as intent by Baker to cause great 
bodily harm.  Therefore, the Board’s conclusion that the facts constituted 
misconduct was not clearly erroneous.256  
B.  Universal Security Corporation v. Department of Employment 
Security257 
The court found that unemployment benefits were wrongly denied in 
Universal Security Corporation.258 In that case, defendant Darvin Hooker 
(“Hooker”) was employed by Universal Security Corporation (“Universal”) 
as an unarmed night security guard at O’Hare International Airport.259  
After only three months of employment, Hooker was caught sleeping while 
on duty by his supervisor. After his termination, Hooker sought 
unemployment insurance benefits but was denied under the Illinois 
Unemployment Insurance Act (“Act”)260 because he had deliberately and 
willfully violated Universal’s policy, which prohibited sleeping on the job.  
Hooker appealed and a referee investigated. During the investigation, 
Hooker explained that he had temporarily dozed off on duty because he was 
tired from working two jobs.  In fact, on the night of the incident, he had 
reported to work a few hours after a 10-hour shift at his other job.  In 
determining whether Hooker engaged in a deliberate and willful violation 
under the Act, the referees concluded that Hooker did not deliberately and 
willfully fall asleep and therefore did not commit “misconduct.”  Therefore, 
Hooker was permitted to claim unemployment insurance benefits.  
Universal appealed the referee’s decision to the Board of Review of the 
Department.  However, the Board agreed with the referee and explained 
“falling asleep on the job is willful only if an individual purposely takes a 
nap.”261  The fact that Hooker dozed off in an open area where all could 
observe him showed a lack of intent. Universal appealed yet again to the 
First District after the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision.262  
The First District Appellate Court agreed that to be considered 
“deliberate and willful,” the Act requires the conduct be intentional.  In 
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examining the legislative intent of the Act, the court noted that definition of 
misconduct expressly rejected the argument that carelessness or negligence 
alone should be equated with willful and deliberate misconduct.263  The 
court held that the circumstances did not show that Hooker intended to fall 
asleep at work given the fact that he was asleep for only a short interval and 
in an upright sitting position in public view.264 Thus, Hooker was eligible 
for unemployment benefits and the Board’s decision was not clearly 
erroneous, despite the fact that Universal had every reason to fire him for 
sleeping on the job.265 
C.  McCleary v. Wells Fargo Securities266 
Written bonus plans as they applied to unemployment benefits were 
examined in McCleary267  Plaintiff, Thomas McCleary (“McCleary”), was 
the director of sales for the defendant, Wells Fargo Securities, L.L.C. 
(“Wells Fargo”).268 As part of his compensation, he was eligible to 
participate in the “Wells Fargo Securities Group Bonus Plan (“Plan”).  The 
Plan specified that former employees who worked at least three months 
during the bonus period, met their performance objectives, and were 
discharged for non-performance reasons, would generally be eligible for 
pro-rated bonuses. After his job was eliminated, McCleary wanted to 
continue to participate in the Plan.269  However, a bonus pool was created to 
pay performance bonuses for the current calendar year, and McCleary was 
not awarded a performance bonus under the Plan.270  McCleary requested 
an internal company review of Wells Fargo’s decision, but was informed 
that although he was eligible, Wells Fargo retained “absolute discretion” to 
determine a bonus award based on a number of factors and ultimately 
determined that he would not receive a bonus payment.271  However, Wells 
Fargo failed to identify any factors that influenced its decision.272  
McCleary filed a complaint and alleged that the Plan was legally 
enforceable and the failure to include him in the bonus pool and pay him a 
prorated bonus for his performance year was a breach of the parties’ 
agreement.273  The circuit court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, 
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finding that the language in the Plan gave Wells Fargo the “absolute 
discretion to determine whether a bonus should be awarded and, if so, the 
amount, ultimately undermines the claim here in all counts.”274  On appeal, 
the First District reversed, concluding that McCleary sufficiently pled 
claims to support a violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection 
Act.275  The circuit court erred when it dismissed McCleary’s amended 
complaint in its entirely based on its finding that Wells Fargo’s “absolute 
discretion” under the Plan undermined McCleary’s claims.276  However, 
McCleary sufficiently pled that Wells Fargo abused its discretion by 
amending the Plan in order to disqualify McCleary’s participation in the 
bonus pool and be awarded a prorated bonus.  Thus, the judgment was 
reversed and remanded.277  
VIII. PENSION AND OTHER FRINGE BENEFITS 
A.  Vaughn v. City of Carbondale278 
At issue in Vaughn,279 was the termination of a police officer’s 
employer-provided health insurance coverage in accordance with section 10 
of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (“Act”).280 While on duty, 
Officer Jeffrey Vaughn (“Vaughn”) was stopped by a motorist who was 
asking for directions when he received a request from dispatch to respond 
over the radio.281  As he reached inside the squad car for the radio, he struck 
the top of his head on the doorframe, causing him immediate pain to his 
head and sharp pain in his arm.282  He sought medical attention after his 
shift, and the physician recommended that he remain off duty.283  Vaughn 
initially received line-of-duty disability pension benefits pursuant to section 
3-114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code,284 but the Carbondale Police Pension 
Board (“Board”) eventually terminated the payments after concluding that 
Vaughn was not injured as a result of his employment.285  
Vaughn filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit 
court.  The court affirmed the Board’s decision to terminate Vaughn’s 
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disability pension payments.286  Vaughn appealed the decision, arguing that 
the City should be required to permanently provide health insurance 
pursuant to the Act because there was no statutory basis to terminate the 
provided insurance coverage once awarded.287  In response, the City argued 
that Vaughn was not entitled to lifetime health insurance coverage under 
the Act because his work-related injury was not incurred as a result of his 
response to fresh pursuit or his response to what he reasonably believed was 
an emergency.288  
The Fifth District observed that pursuant to section 10 of the Act, a 
full-time law enforcement officer and their family are eligible to receive 
health insurance benefits if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the officer must 
have suffered a catastrophic injury in the line of duty, and (2) the injury 
must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response to fresh pursuit or 
the officer’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an 
unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a 
criminal act.289  The Fifth District reversed the circuit court’s decision, 
concluding that the evidence supported the finding that the plaintiff was 
injured during the course of his employment and was therefore eligible for a 
line-of-duty pension.290  The court reasoned that Vaughn’s work-related 
injury occurred as a result of his response to what he reasonably believed 
was an emergency.  Specifically, the court recognized that although there 
was no evidence presented that the dispatch call resulted in an emergency 
situation, it was an officer’s duty to respond to dispatch calls in a timely 
manner and to be prepared for any eventuality.291  An officer cannot know 
the nature of the call until he responds.292  The evidence established that 
Vaughn was engaged in the act of responding to what he believed was a 
potential emergency that could have been involved in imminent danger to a 
person or property and therefore required an urgent response.293  Thus, the 
court reversed and remanded the judgment.294 
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B.  Majid v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund 
of the City of Chicago295 
Majid is another interesting case involving a police officer’s disability 
benefits.296  The plaintiff, Nail Majid, served as a Chicago police officer 
from 1999 until he was injured in 2003.297  He was awarded a line-of-duty 
disability benefit and subsequently relocated to Ohio.298 While in Ohio, he 
was indicted and charged with two felony offenses: two counts of 
impersonating an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency299 and one count 
of possession of an unregistered firearm.300  Majid pled guilty to possession 
of an unregistered firearm pursuant to a plea agreement and he was 
sentenced to three years’ probation.301  The Retirement Board of the 
Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (“Board”) 
suspended Majid’s disability benefits pending a hearing upon learning of 
the felony conviction.302  Majid argued before the Board that he was 
convicted of a felony under the federal classification, and therefore the 
possession of an unregistered weapon charge should not be considered a 
felony for purposes of section 5-227.303  Furthermore, Majid argued that 
section 5-227 was ambiguous.304  The Board found that it was undisputed 
that Majid had been convicted of a felony while receiving disability 
benefits and issued a written order denying Majid’s application for 
reinstatement.305  Majid appealed and the circuit court affirmed the Board’s 
decision.306  On further appeal to the First District, Majid argued that the 
Board ignored the legislative intent that the felony conviction must have a 
nexus with his service as a police office before disability benefits could be 
terminated.307  The court disagreed, reasoning that the Majid’s 
interpretation of section 5-227 conflicted with previous court opinions.308 
Majid further argued that the hearing at which his disability benefit was 
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terminated violated his right to procedural due process under the Illinois 
Constitution and the United States Constitution because he did not have the 
opportunity to argue that his felony conviction was not related to his service 
as a police officer and because his wife was not called as a witness.309  The 
court disagreed, holding that the nexus issue was previously addressed and 
that his own testimony established the basis for the forfeiture of his 
disability benefit.310  Therefore, the decision of the Board and the circuit 
court’s holding were affirmed, and the termination of Majid’s disability 
benefits was proper.311 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CASES 
A. Negligent Hiring and Retention 
 
The Second District affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Boy 
Scouts of America (“BSA”) in Doe v. Boy Scouts of America,312 a case 
involving the sexual assault of a minor boy scout by a former employee of a 
local scouting council.  The plaintiff, Jane Doe (“Doe”), the mother of John 
Doe (“John”), filed a complaint alleging that BSA was negligent in 
screening, hiring and retaining a man who sexually assaulted her son after 
the employment with BSA had been terminated.  Doe alleged that BSA 
should have known that the perpetrator posed a threat of sexual abuse to 
children and that BSA failed to conduct background checks on new or 
existing scout leaders, employees or volunteers.313  BSA moved for 
summary judgment, denying that it had any duty to protect John when the 
sexual assaults occurred, because the perpetrator was no longer employed 
by the BSA.314  In response, Doe argued that a duty of care arose, because 
BSA voluntarily undertook to protect scouts from dangerous individuals 
such as pedophiles.315  
The circuit court determined there was no material fact question on 
negligence and that BSA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The 
court held that the perpetrator was no longer employed by BSA when the 
incident occurred and that BSA adequately executed all voluntary 
protective measures that they undertook.316  Doe appealed, but the Second 
District affirmed the decision, finding that it was not reasonably foreseeable 
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that the perpetrator would sexually molest young boys.317  Moreover, there 
was no evidence that BSA intended to continue to protect John after 
perpetrator was terminated, and, therefore, did not voluntarily undertake the 
duty to protect young from sexual predators as alleged by Doe.318  
 
B. Illinois Personnel Record Review Act 
 
Harrison v. Deere & Co.319 was one of three lawsuits filed by plaintiff 
Andre Harrison (“Harrison”) in response to the termination of his 
employment be the defendant, Deere & Company (“Deere”).  In this case, 
Harrison claimed violations by Deere under the Illinois Personnel Record 
Review Act (“Act”)320 when Deere assembled an investigative record of his 
associations, communications and non-employment activities and failed to 
provide him a copy of the report, which supported his discharge within the 
appropriate time period.321  The investigation was initiated due to 
allegations that Harrison had engaged in sexual misconduct with 
subordinate employees.322  Harrison was fired a month later for violation of 
company policy, which prohibited managers from engaging in sexual 
relationships with subordinate employees.323  Harrison subsequently 
requested a copy of his personnel file and the corresponding investigative 
report, which disclosed the facts of the investigation.324  However, Harrison 
received the personnel file without the investigative report.  Thereafter, he 
filed a complaint seeking enforcement of section 2 of the Act with the 
Department of Labor.325  Harrison finally received the investigative records 
after a request by his attorney.326  In his complaint, Harrison alleged that 
these activities were racially motivated, constituted an invasion of his 
privacy and resulted in his wrongful termination.327  
The circuit court held in favor of Deere and Harrison appealed, 
arguing that Deere did not submit the appropriate personnel documents with 
the seven-day time frame required by section 2 of the Act, and, should, 
therefore, be subject to the penalty imposed by the statute which provides 
for $200 plus costs, reasonable attorney’s fees and actual damages.328  In 
determining whether Deere’s violation was willful, the court concluded that 
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Harrison was not eligible for attorneys’ fees, because the court did not 
compel Deere to comply with the statutory requirements to produce the 
report for inspection and Deere complied without any need for Harrison to 
hire counsel.329  However, the court found that Deere was subject to a petty 
offense for violating a provision of the Act by providing Harrison with the 
complete set of records in 25 working days rather than the statutorily 
required seven days.330  Harrison’s invasion of privacy and wrongful 
termination arguments also failed because they were barred by res 
judicata.331  Therefore, the circuit court’s decision was affirmed.332 
 
C. Whistleblower Act 
 
In Larsen v. Provena Hospitals,333 the Fourth District analyzed the 
Illinois Whistleblower Act334 as applied to a physician’s employment.  In 
that case, the defendant, Provena Hospitals (“Provena”) declined to renew 
the medical staff membership and clinical privileges of plaintiff, Dr. L. 
Royce Larsen (“Larsen”) after his 31 years of service.335  Larsen filed a 
complaint alleging that Provena retaliated against him because he had made 
reports to government agencies that revealed Provena’s violations of 
various state and federal laws.336  Larsen sought damages as a result of 
Provena’s alleged willful and wanton misconduct in harming his medical 
practice and professional reputation.337  Provena filed a motion to dismiss 
Larsen’s complaint on the basis that Larsen did not sufficiently plead 
willful and wanton conduct under section 10.2 of the Hospital Act.338 
Furthermore, Larsen was not a protected employee under the Whistleblower 
Act because Larsen failed to allege that Provena received state funding.339  
The circuit court partially granted Provena’s motion to dismiss, 
finding that harm to a physician’s medical practice and professional 
reputation was not the type of harm required to state a claim for willful and 
wanton misconduct under the Hospital Act.340  Yet, the court denied 
Provena’s motion to dismiss Larsen’s retaliation claim, finding in part that 
the Whistleblower Act applied due to Provena’s state funding in the form of 
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Medicaid payments.341  On interlocutory appeal,342 the court was presented 
with four certified questions, which addressed whether Larsen’s status as an 
employee was protected under the Whistleblower Act.343  The court noted 
that section 5 of the Whistleblower Act defined an employee as an 
individual who is “employed on a full-time, part-time, or contractual basis 
by an employer and includes, but is not limited to, a licensed physician who 
practices his or her profession in whole or in part, at a hospital, nursing 
home, clinic or any medical facility that is a health care facility funded, in 
whole or in part, by the State.”344  The court determined that the answer to 
the question depended on the interpretation of the last phrase the 
definition—whether a health care facility was funded, in whole or in part, 
by the State.345  Provena argued that Medicaid benefits were not state funds 
as contemplated by section 30 of the Whistleblower Act.346  The court 
disagreed with Provena’s argument but nevertheless determined that a 
Medicaid payment is not funding as contemplated by section 5 of the 
Whistleblower Act.347  The court answered the first question in the 
affirmative and the remaining three in the negative, and the case was 
remanded.348  
 
D. Drug Free Workplace Policy 
 
The First District analyzed an interesting issue relating to the 
relatively new statute known as the Drug Free Workplace Act.349  In 
Walker, Cook County deputy sheriff Mister Walker (“Walker”) was 
selected randomly by a computer for a drug test.350  Walker’s sample 
testified positive for oxazepam,351 which is a controlled substance under 
schedule IV of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.352  An investigation 
followed and a complaint was filed.353  At the hearing before the Cook 
County Sheriff’s Merit Board (“Merit Board”), an investigator testified that 
although the prescription bottle was dated from 1995, Walker had told her 
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that a now-deceased doctor prescribed the medication.354  The investigator 
concluded that the 1995 prescription was not a valid prescription at the time 
of testing and Walker was therefore in violation of the drug policy.355  
At trial, Walker testified that before he was employed by the sheriff 
for 32 years, he had served in the Vietnam War and suffered from medical 
conditions stemming from exposure to Agent Orange356 and has taken 
prescription medications at various times to help him sleep and for anxiety 
as needed.357  Despite Walker’s justification, the Merit Board issued a 
decision, which resulted in Walker’s termination due to the violation of the 
drug policy.358  Walker filed a complaint for administrative review in the 
circuit court, but the court affirmed the Merit Board’s decision.359  
Walker appealed and argued that the Merit Board’s decision was 
erroneous because the drug policy did not state that employees were 
prohibited from taking validly obtained prescription drugs after a certain 
period of time elapsed since the prescription was filled.360  On the other 
hand, the defendants, the Merit Board and Cook County Sheriff Thomas 
Dart, contended that the drug policy can be violated in three ways: (1) the 
presence of drugs or controlled substances in the employee’s system; (2) 
the use of non-prescribed controlled substances; and (3) the abuse of legally 
prescribed drugs or controlled substances.361  The court reversed the 
decision, holding that the Merit Board’s conclusion was not supported by 
an appropriate statute, ordinance or rule.362  The defendants cited to section 
312(a) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, which the court 
determined, was directed only at pharmacists.363  Furthermore, the court 
held that there was no medical testimony to establish that taking medication 
from an older prescription bottle was not within the limits of “a medically 
valid prescription” or that Walker’s conduct was an abuse of prescription 
medication.364  Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence used to 
support the unwritten drug policy was based on speculation and was 
therefore against the manifest weight of evidence.365 
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The courts provided some well-reasoned decisions during this period 
of time.  
 In a case of first impression, Section 6.1 of the Illinois Public Labor 
Relations Act was in dispute in an action filed by AFSCME challenging 
removal of certain positions from the collective bargaining unit as 
unconstitutional.  The court upheld that classifications based on certain 
positions did not violate procedural due process under the constitution. 
It continues to be difficult to obtain a decision denying unemployment 
benefits based on the willful and deliberate language in the definition of 
misconduct in the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act.  Violence or 
threats of violence seem to be treated differently in that the first occurrence 
of a violation of a workplace violence policy is usually enough to be 
considered misconduct.  It does not have to be repeated after a warning, and 
is almost always determined to be willful and deliberate.  Most other 
misconduct will take repeated violations of rule or policy or some proven 
harm, which is often hard to quantify.   
Employers in Illinois who wish to retain discretion regarding to whom 
to award bonuses, should carefully review their written bonus plans before 
implementation.  If an employee is able to sufficiently plead their claims 
that the employer abused its discretion in amending a bonus plan to 
disqualify an employee’s participation, the employee may succeed in 
obtaining payment under the bonus plan. 
 
